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NOTES
MATTERS NOT PROTECTED

BY COPYRIGHT.-When a man writes a

book, a poem, or drama, or paints a picture, there is presumably some
quality that sets it apart from all other books, poems, plays and pictures. It is this certain originality, or uniqueness, that the law seeks to
protect by means of copyright law. Copyright may be accurately defined as the right granted by statute to the proprietor of an intellectual
production to its exclusive use and enjoyment to the extent specified in
the statute.' The law wishes to grant the author some privilege which
he has earned by his intellectual labor which others can't share. This
is the general purpose of copyright law.
Copyright law has been divided into common law copyright and
statutory copyright. There ,is little similarity between the two, each
providing for an entirely different stage of the publication of an intellectual work. Copyright at common law protected the author of a work
from publication or plagarism until he had published his writing, but
once so published, this work was -subject to copying by anyone so desiring. Statutory copyright on the other hand protects the author after
his article has been published from misuse of his rights acquired under
1

18 C. J. S. 138.
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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
that copyright. "The peculiar right conferred by statutory copyright
is to multiply copies after publication to the exclusion of others." 2
When one refers to copyright, they usually mean the statutory right,
and that is to what this article will be confined.
This copyright protection might easily be carried too far and protect matter not worthy of protection, perhaps thus stifling literary accomplishment by others. Lord Mansfield, in the old English case of
Sayre v. Moore,3 states this problem admirably. "We must take care
to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial. The one that men of
ability who have employed their time for the service of the community
may not be deprived of their just merits and the reward of their ingenuity and labor; the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded." If copyright
is to attain the sought-for mean, it would seem that this field should
be more closely defined to determine just what is subject to copyright
protection, and it shall be the object of this article to show just what
matter is not protected by copyright law. 4 This is a broad subject, and
necessarily classification may be somewhat faulty, some points perhaps
overlapping.
1.

Ideas, Systems, and Information

It is a general proposition in copyright law that the protection of the
statute may not be obtained for an idea, or a- system, or for general
information. The ideas or intellectual conceptions embodied in the copyright work are not protected by that work's copyright; it is only the
particular phrasing, the author's arrangement of his ideas, or his style
that is protected. The reason for this seems obvious, "The object of
copyright is to promote science and useful arts. If an author, by originating a new arrangement and form of expressing certain ideas or conceptions could withdraw those ideas or conceptions from the stock of
materials to be used by other authors, each copyright would narrow
the field of thought." 5 And again, "A copyright does not give a monopoly in any incident of a play. Other authors have a right to exploit
the facts, experiences, field of thought and general ideas, provided they
do not substantially copy a concrete form in which the circumstances
and ideas have been developed, arranged, and put into shape." 6 The
right secured by copyright is not the right to the idea. In this statement, we have the necessary imputation that the plot of a play or book
is not subject to copyright, nor is it protected in a copyrighted book,
2

3
4

Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N. Y. 532, 533.
1 East 361.
U. S. C. A., Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, § 7. Also see AMDUR'S CoPy-

RIGnT LAW AND PRACTICE.
-5 Eichel et al. v. Marcin, 241 F. 404 (1913).

6 Ibid.
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and this is borne out by the authorities. 7 In London v. Biograph Company,8 Jack London, the author of "Just Meat," sued the defendant
for the production of a motion picture entitled "Love of Gold," in
which the plot was very similar to that of the book: in both two thieves
commit their crime, and return to a common meeting place and discuss,
with some heat, the disposition of their unlawfully gained spoils. Each
succeeds unknown to the other in poisoning his comrade, and both die,
with some variances in the specific instances which bring out this almost identical plot. However, the court held that there was no infringement of Mr. London's copyright, saying, "The copyright cannot
protect the fundamental plot which was the common property long before the story was written. It will protect the embellishments with
which the author added elements of literary value to the old plot."
Again, in Nichols v. Universal Pictures,9 the plaintiff had written and
obtained a copyright on a play, "Abie's Irish Rose." The defendant
produced a motion picture entitled "The Cohens and the Kellys."
There was a great. deal-. of similarity between the plots of the two
works: both were built around antagonism between Irish and Jews,
and a final reconciliation because of the love between their children.
The court denied the plaintiff his relief, "There is no monopoly in such
a background. The plaintiff discovered the vein, she could not keep it
to herself; so defined, the theme was too general an abstraction from
what she wrote. It was only an idea. A comedy based upon conflicts
between Irish and Jews into which the marriage of their children enters, is no more susceptible of copyright than the outline of 'Romeo
and Juliet.'"
Also, you cannot secure a copyright on a particular plan or system,
nor is such plan or system in a copyrighted work, protected by that
copyright. A system or method being but an intellectual conception is
not protected by the copyright of a book in which it is set forth and
explained. A leading case on this is Guthrie v. Curlett.10 Here there
were many freight tariff indexes on file with the Interstate Commerce
Commission. The plaintiff wrote and copyrighted a pamphlet, entitled
"Tariff Economics as Applied to the Tariff Index," explaining a rather
complicated system of consolidation of freight tariffs. The defendant
later prepared a consolidated freight tariff which the plaintiff claimed
infringed his copyright. Both pamphlets relied largely for simplification and solution on a consolidation made possible by use of ruled columns and compound specific interest symbols. The court, in deciding
there was no infringement, remarked, "This idea alone, apart from the
means of expressing it, is not protected by his copyright." The copy7 Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F. 2d 690 (1926); Stodart v. Mutual Film Corp., 249
F. 597 (1917).
8 231 F. 696 (1916).
9

10

45 F. 2d 119 (1930).
36 F. 2d 694 (1929).
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right was said to protect only the author's peculiar expression of his
ideas, or rather, protect his ideas only when expressed as he expressed
them.
"The intricate nature of the work, the subject involved and the
result to be obtained, make it inevitable that within the scope of the
works, the same information can be found, but the appellant has no
monopoly upon information, or the purveying of information by a broad
general method." Nor was a copyright on a book of a system of bookkeeping infringed by a similar book, using a similar plan so far as results were concerned, but using a different arrangement of columns and
column headings." Nor was a system of piano salesmanship copyrightable;' 2 nor the Ford Motor Company's plan of buying cars through
weekly installments and deposits; 13 nor a new art or system of stenography;14 nor a plan of medical instruction;'5 nor a method of selling. 16 A copyright cannot be obtained on a particular distribution of
cards in problems of play or principles of contract bridge applicable
to their solution; 17 nor is there literary property susceptible of copyright protection in the conventional rules of a game, as distinguished
from the mode of expressing them.' 8 A system of contract bridge playing is an idea, property in which cannot be secured by copyright law."'
In line with the reasoning of these cases, are others: A "Bank-Nite"
system which the plaintiff had originated and furnished to motion picture theatres by license could not be copyrighted; "0 no copyright was
allowed in a pamphlet containing articles of association and the by-laws
22
of a mutual burial association, 21 or'in blank forms .of liquor licenses.
The court, although holding there was an infringement by the defendant's forms for liquor licenses, said that .anyone would be at liberty to
prepare and publish such forms, but that here infringement existed because the defendant had actually copied the plaintiff's work, and thus
had violated more than the idea or system.
An advertising system is not a fit subject of copyright. In Ehret v.
Pierce,23 the plaintiff had copyrighted certain advertising cards for
the purpose of displaying paints and their various colors. The de11
12

13
14

15
151 C.
16
17

18
19
20
21
22

23

William Baker v. Elizabeth Selden, 101 U. S. 99, 25 L. Ed. 841 (1879).
Stone & McCarrick v. Dugan Piano Co., 210 F. 399 (1914).
Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 28 F. 2d 529 (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1928).
Griggs v. Perrin, 49 F. 15 (C. C. N. Y., 1890).
Chautauqua School of Nursing v. National School of Nursing, 288 F. 151,
C. A. 227 (N. Y., 1916).
Kaeser & Blair v. Merchants' Ass'n., 64 F. 2d 575 (Ohio, 1933).
Russell v. Northeastern Publishing Co., 7 F. Supp. 571 (D. C. Mass., 1934).
Whist Club v. Foster, 42 F. 2d 782 (D. C. N. Y., 1929).
Downes v. Culbertson, 275 N. Y. Supp. 233, 153 Misc. 14.
Affiliated Enterprises v. Gruber, 86 F. 2d 958 (C. C. A. Mass., 1937).
Burk v. Johnson, 146 F. 209, 76 C. C. A. 567 (Kan., 1906).
Brightley v. Littleton, 37 F. 103 (C. C. E. D. Pa., 1888).
10 F. 553 (S. D. N. Y., 1880).
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fendant had similar advertisements, with of course, different words
on the cards. The court said, "The real matter of plaintiff's complaint
is, not that defendant has copied his card - that would occasion him
no loss, but on the contrary, for it would be a gratuitous advertisement
of his paints - but that defendant in advertising his wares, has adopted
the same method pursued by him in advertising his wares, and his claim
amounts in substance to claiming the exclusive right to employ that
method in advertising. Such a method cannot in my opinion -be acquired under copyright laws." However, see the-case of Ansel v.
Puritan Pharmacal Co. 24 where the plaintiff advertised a cosmetic
The deknown as "Vivani," and copyrighted his advertisement for it.
fendant also manufactured cosmetics and published a very similar
advertisement. The court held that the expression of the two ideas
was so close that there was an infringement.
"Copyright law protects the means of expressing an idea; and it is
as near the whole truth as generalization can reach that, if the same
idea can be expressed in a plurality of totally different manners, a
plurality of copyrights may result and no infringement will exist. The
plaintiff's copyright did not protect his ideas for an ad, but it did protect his illustration and expression of those ideas in pictures and language. The defendants might appropriate the ideas and express them
in their own pictures and their own wording." This case is not really
in conflict with the Ehret Case, because both state the fundamental
proposition that the idea for an advertisement is not subject to copyright protection, but here the defendant had so closely copied the
plaintiff's illustrations and language that it was an infringement of
the actual expression of the idea, and not of the idea itself. After all,
these questions are largely ones of fact, and generalizations regarding
them must be reached carefully.
If information and ideas are not subject to copyright by statute, it
would seem to follow logically that news, as such, is not copyrightable
either. And this is the general rule, that the information element in
news is not subject to copyright protection. 25 A leading case on the
subject is The Chicago Record-Herald v. Tribune Ass'n. 26 Here the
plaintiff had secured a copyright on an article stating news of Germany's hope of succeeding in the last World War by reason of a new
fleet of submarines. The court said, "News as such is not subject to
copyright, and if the defendant's publication were only a statement
of the news in the plaintiff's article, the action would not lie. But the
article involved authorship, literary quality, and style, apart from the
24 61 F. 2d 131 (1932). But see Edwards & Deutch Lithographing Co. v.
Boorman, 15 F. 2d 35 (1926); Deward & Rich et al. v. Bristol Savings and Loan
Co., 29 F. Supp. 777 (D. C. Va., 1939).
25 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 39 Sup. Ct.
69, 2 A. L. R. 293 (N. Y., 1918).
28 275 F. 797 (C. C. A. 7th, 1921).
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bare recital of facts, and was protected by copyright laws. The defendant copied the particular power of portrayal and felicity of wording and phrasing." Therefore it seems clear that news as such is not
copyrightable, although the literary value of some particularly meritorious feature is protected, but not because of its news element. An
English case, Oldham Press v. London & Provincial Sporting News
Agency, 27 held that bookmakers odds were merely news and not subject to copyright, and an American case decided that news items relating to building and engineering construction work are not within
the operation of the copyright statute.28 An actual happening is within
the public domain; thus where a play, "Dishonored Lady" and a
movie, "Letty Lytton" were both based on the famous murder trial
of Madeleine Smith in 1857, the court held the movie did not infringe
the play's copyright because all the facts were in the public domain
29
and not subject to copyright protection.
It seems to be the universal rule that words are not copyrightable
either. In Lewys v. O'Neill,30 Lewys sued Eugene O'Neill for infringement of the former's book, "Temple of Pallas," by the defendant's "Strange Interlude;" the plaintiff showed certain similarities in
phrases used by the characters - such as one actor in a particular
scene calling another "an old fox." The court said that the plaintiff
couldn't claim a copyright on words in the dictionary, or on usual
English idioms. Thus copyright gives no exclusive right to the use of
words, but rather protects the order in which they are employed to
give expression to the author's Ideas. 31
2.

Things of Practical Use

A thing which is intended solely to be put into practical use cannot be copyrighted, for this is really in the field of patent law. Articles
designed for physical use rather than to convey information or intellectual conceptions are not copyrightable, and must be protected,
if at all, under patent laws. 32 Copyright statute generally gives protection to books, but not so to books of the following types: blank
books for use in business or carrying out any system of transacting affairs, such as record books, account books, memorandum books, blank
diaries, or journals, bank deposit and check books; forms of contracts
or leases which do not contain original copyrightable matters; coupons;
27
28

29

153 L. T. R. (N. S.) 327 (1935). See 22 VA. L. REv. 587.
Gilmore v. Sammons, 269 S. W. 861 (Texas Civ. App., 1925).
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 7 F. Supp. 837 (S. D. N. Y.,

1934).

30 49 F. 603 (S. D. N. Y., 1931).
31 Park v. Warner Bros., 8 F. Supp. 37, (S. D. N. Y., 1934); Jeffrys v.
Boosey, 4 H. L. C. 815; Oliver Wendell Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U. S. 82, 43 L. Ed.
904 (1899).

32

18 C. J. S. 173.
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forms for use in commercial, legal, or financial transactions which are
33
wholly or partly blank and whose sole value lies in their usefulness.
Rule 12 of the Copyright Office says that the following are utilitarian in
purpose and are not subject to copyright; toys, games, dolls, advertising novelties, instruments or tools of any kind, glassware, embroideries,
garments, laces, woven fabrics, or similar articles. 34 In agreement with
this is Rule 8 of the Copyright Office which names the following as
not being protected by the copyright law: dances, animal shows,
scenery, stage properties, movie scenarios (unless in book form), 35 although there is a special provision in the copyright statute for dramatic
performances.
Amberg File & Index Co. v. Shea Smith & Co.3 ; is a leading case
on this subject; here a system of indexes constituting a letter file, beig designed for use and not for conveying information was not a proper
subject of copyright. The court pointed out the fundamental difference
between copyright and letters patent: the object of the former is explanation, while that of the latter is utility. An inventor who had applied for and obtained a patent could not get a copyright on the dia38
grams for his invention.3 7 However, in Kings Features v. Fleischer,
the court allowed a copyright on a doll, named Sparky, which was
modeled after the picture of the horse in the comic cartoon, "Barney
Google and Spark Plug." The court said here that the form of the
horse, embodying the sense of humor, was the essence of the cartoon,
and the cartoon couldn't be copied by manufacturing a toy or doll, without taking the copyrightable form of the concept of the picture. And
in Falk v. Howell,39 a copyright of a photograph illustrating a musical
composition of Yum Yum in Gilbert and Sullivan's "Mikado" was
infringed by stamping this picture in raised figures on leather chair
bottoms and back. Any attempt at reconciliation between these cases
and the Amberg File Case probably must be done on the basis of just
*what is a thing of utility, and then decide that the utility of the articles
in the Sparky Case and the Falk Case was outweighed by their artistic
value. There have been attempts to secure a copyright on things of
practical use by calling them reproductions of art, but courts have
generally seen through this subterfuge. 40 A matter quite in point is
that copyright of a pictorial illustration of an article conveys no exclusive monopoly in the making or selling of the article itself; the
Rule 5 of the Copyright Office. See AwDuR, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE.
Rule 12 of the Copyright Office. See Adelman v. Sommers & Gordon, 21
U. S. PAT. Q. 218.
35 Rule 8 of the Copyright Office.
36 82 F. 314, (C. C. A. 7th, 1897).
87 Korsybyski v. Underwood and Underwood, Inc., 36 F. 2d 729 (C. C. A.
2nd, 1929).
88 299 F. 533 (C. C. A. 7th, 1924).
89 37 F. 202 (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 1888).
40 Horsman & Aetna Doll v. Kaufman, 285 F. 373 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1922).
33

34
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copyright merely protects the copying of the illustration into another
illustration. 4 1 This would seem only to discredit further the findings in
the Sparky and Falk cases, unless you decide that the doll was not a
thing of utility, or that the leather seat cover was more a picture of
Yum Yum than a seat cover.
3.

Government Publicationsand Official Court Opinions

The Copyright Act of 1909 says, "No copyright shall subsist . . .
in any publication of the United States Government, or any reprint,
in whole or in part thereof," 42 then stating that a government republication of a copyrighted work cannot be an abridgment of the copyright. From this it would seem clear that products of government publication are not property to be protected by copyright law. Thus, in
Woodman v. Lydiard-Peterson4. the court, citing. the Act of March 4,
1909, Section 7, decided that no copyright could be obtained on the
features of a map which had previously appeared on a government map,
but that certain new features the plaintiff had added could be copyrighted. In Du Puy v. Post Telegram, 44 the plaintiff newspaper published and copyrighted an article entitled, "Peace Day in Uncle Sam's
Schools," based on a peace day program as outlined in a government
pamphlet of the United States Bureau of Education. The defendant
newspaper had substantially copied the plaintiff's article, but the court
denied the plaintiff relief, saying that the bulletin was an official public document, one which by its public character was by statute exempted
from copyright appropriation. That which had been given to the public
in an official bulletin could not afterwards be taken from that public
in the guise of copyright, and an article based on the official reports
of General Pershing could not be protected.4C Also where the complainant had made a map of the principal cities of North America,
largely copied from a government map, misplacement of some of the
cities and use of three different kinds of symbols was too trivial a change
46
to allow the validity of his copyright.
There is some difficulty when it comes to official court reports, and
other legal writings, for it has been the policy of the law to protect
and grant copyright to the reporter in his compilation of the official
opinions with his own syllabi; but it seems that he could secure no
copyright for the official syllabus of the court. The courts in deter41 National Cloak Co. v. Standard Mail Order, 191 F. 528 (S. D. N. Y.,
1911); Lamb v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 39 F. 474 (Mich., 1889); National
Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman, 189 F. 215 (C. C. M. D. Pa., 1911).
42 Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, § 7. Also see Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145 (D. C. N. Y., 1924).
43 192 F. 67 (C. C. Minn., 1912).
44 210 F. 883, 127 C. . A. 493 (1914).
45 Eggers v. Sun Sales Corp., 263 F. 373 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1920).
46 Andrews v. Guenther Pub. Co., 60 F. 2d 555 (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1932).
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mining whether there has been a copyright infringement in these cases
have run into a good deal. of trouble, and tread a tightrope that is
precarious to say the least. The general rule seems to be that if the reporter or the publisher of the reports obtains a copyright, he is only
protected from an actual copying of these reports by another - that
another digester could not copy his work, .but could use it for a guide
in conducting his own investigations which would ultimately lead to
practically the same result. But see Banks Law Publishing Company
v. Lawyers' Co-Op.47 where the court said, "Conceding the right of the
official reporter of the Supreme Court of the United States to secure
a copyright on his own work in volumes of published reports, the mere
arrangement of cases and sequence and their paging and distribution
into volumes are not fratures of such importance, as to entitle him to
copyright protection of such details." Under the reasoning above, just
what would a reporter have to add to official reports in the line of
novel and original steps to obtain copyright protection? Official law
reports are hardly open to literary elaboration. The Montana court in
State ex rel. Helena Allied Printing Council v. Mitchell 48 makes the
bald statement that anything contained in an opinion prepared and
published by the court cannot be copyrighted. In accord with this decision are statutes in some states, among them New York,49 which
forbid the obtaining of any copyright or exclusive right of publication
in the court reports. And in Davidson v. Wheelock,O0 the tribunal said
that while a compilation of the statutes of a state may be so original
as to entitle the author to a copyright on account of the skill and judgment displayed in the combination and analysis, he cannot obtain a
copyright for the publication of the laws alone, nor can the legislature
confer any such privilege upon him. "Materials for such, publication
are open to the world. They are public records, subject to inspection
by anyone, under such rules as will secure their preservation." However, in Banks v. McDivitt,-' a copyright infringement was decided
for the complainant where the defendant had copied the Rules of
Practice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, because he
had actually copied the plaintiff's work, not reaching his results from
private investigation. It is questionable whether this result would be
reached now in New York in the face of the New York statute previously cited.
It would seem from the cases cited in this section that copyright
will not protect matters from a government publication, and will protect
compilations of legal reports only in so far as these compilations have
47 169 F. 386 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1909). Also Edwaid Thompson Co. v. American
Law Book Co., 122 F. 922, 62 L. R. A. 607 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1903).
48 74 P. 2d 417 (Mont., 1938).
49 NEW YORK CONSOLIDATED LAWS, Ch. 31, § 442.
50 127 F. 61 (C. C. D. Minn., 1866).
51 13 Blatchf. 163, 2 F. Cas. 759, F. Cases 961 (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 1875).
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some particular merit in the arranging and annotations, or in the reporter's own syllabus. 52 After all, about all of these legal reports are
matters of common knowledge, at least supposedly among lawyers, and
there should be something beyond their public nature to protect them
from someone else using them.
4.

Titles and Authors' Names

Contrary to a rather popular impression, the title of a copyrighted
work, apart from the work itself, is not protected by its copyright.
Thus the fact that you have a copyright on a book will not prevent
another from using the same title on another, but dissimilar, work.
In Osgood v. Allen, 53 the title of a copyrighted publication was "Our
Young Folks" and the plaintiff sought to restrain the use of the words,
"gour young folks" as a name for the defendant's periodical. The court
said, "The title does not necessarily involve any literary composition;
it may not be, and certainly the statute does not require it to be, the
product of the author's mind. It is a mere appendage, which only identifies and frequently does not in any way describe, the literary composition itself." Thus, in Patten v. Superior Talking Pictures,54 it was
decided that the copyright to the "Frank Merriwell" books did not
protect the title. However, the court granted the plaintiff relief on the
grounds of unfair competition. The same line of reasoning was used in
the case of Warner Brothers, Inc. v. Majestic,55 where the plaintiff
had secured a copyright on his motion picture and play, "The Gold
Diggers," and "Gold Diggers of Broadway," both "of which had enjoyed considerable successes. The defendant had produced a movie
entitled, "Gold Diggers in Paris;" the court said that the copyright
did not carry with it the protection of the title. But again relief was
granted for the plaintiff not on a breach or infringement of his copyright, but on a liability under unfair trade practices, saying that the
words "gold diggers" in the defendant's title would be unfair and misleading and would represent to the public that the picture was produced by Warner Brothers. It has been said that the copyright of a
book does not prevent others from taking the same title for another
book, although the copyright on that book has not expired; nor is
a title in itself subject to a copyright. 5 6
It can be seen from a perusal of these cases that the courts are
eager to protect the author of the title on the basis of unfair trade 52 West Publishing Co. v. Edw. Thompson Co., 176 F. 833 (C. C. A. 2nd,
1910); Mead v. West Pub. Co., 80 F. 380 (C. C. D. Minn., 1896); West Publishing Co. v. Lawyer's Co-Op. Publishing Co., 64 F. 360, 25 L. R. A. 441 (C. C.
N. Y., 1894).
53 18 F. Cas. 871, 1 Holmes 185 (C. C. Me., 1872).
54 8 F. Supp. 196 (D. C. N. Y., 1934).

55

70 F. 2d 310 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1934).

56

Glaser et al. v. St. Elmo, (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 1909).
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that the title must not be used as a false token to mislead the subsequent readers into the belief that the second work is that of the
original owner of the copyright. Titles will especially be protected in
this field of unfair competition where it has acquired a secondary
significance in that the public has come to absolutely identify the
particular work by its name. Thus in Foundation Films v. National
Pictures,57 while the plaintiff's copyright to his motion picture, "Blind
Youth" was not infringed by the defendant using "Blindness of Youth"
in his motion picture, the court decided there was unfair competition.
It laid down a test of competition, ". . . that.there must be a real
present or prospective competition, that is, an endeavor to get the
same trade from the same people at the same time and that endeavor
on the defendant's part must be unfair, that is, with a wrongful intent
to gain advantage of that celebrity." In Atlas Manufacturing Co. v.
O._G. Smith' 8 although the plaintiff had issued a series of "dime novels"
entitled the "Nick Carter" stories, and the defendant had filmed a picture called "Nick Carter, the Great American Detective, or Solving the
$100,000 Jewel Mystery" but took nothing of the plot or situations
from any of the plaintiff's stories, it was held that there was no infringement of copyright, nor was there any unfair competition. In Alonson v.
Fleckenstein,5 0 the court refused to consider whether there was copyright infringement, because the important thing was to determine
whether the defendant by his operetta was endeavoring to avail himself of the reputation made by the plaintiff. There has been some confusion of this issue in a few cases; thus, in Paramorev. Mack Sennett,60
the court in considering whether there was.an infringement of the copyright on plaintiff's poem, "Yukon Jake," by the defendant's piece with
a similar title, decided there was an infringement, although all their
reasoning seemed to lead to the more valid conclusion that recovery
for the plaintiff could be allowed only on the idea of unfair competition.
In line with this matter of titles is the ruling that an author has
no exclusive rights to the use of his name. The famous case illustrating
this point is that of Clemens v. Bedford (The Mark Twain Case) 1 in
which the court handed down a decision to the effect that copyright
did not protect the author's name, nor his nom de plume. However,
this does not mean that the author is left without recourse for an unwarranted and unsanctioned use of his name, for several states have
statutes protecting the "right of privacy," thus prohibiting the unau2
thorized use of a name or portrait for advertising and other purposes.Y
266 F. 208 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1920).
122 C. C. A. 568, 204 F. 398, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1002 (1913).
59
28 F. 75 (C. C. Ill., 1886).
60 9 F. 2d 66 (D. C. Cal., 1925).
61 14 F. 728 (N. D. Ill., 1883). Also Eliot v. Jones, 120 N. Y. Supp. 789,
66 Misc. 95 (1910).
62 Ellis v. Hurst, 128 N. Y. Supp. 145, 70 Misc. 122 (1910).
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5. Need of Merit
A question that is sometimes propounded with regard to copyright
law is: just what degree of merit is required to enable the author to
secure a copyright? Must he be inventive; must his work meet with
some established literary test; must it have a certain popular demand?
Most authorities do not require inventive skill, and the author is entitled to copyright protection if the work is the result of only ordinary
skill. Thus in Jewelers' CircularPublishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing
Co.,63 the court decided that a compilation of trade marks of various
firms engaged in the jewelry and allied trades was a directory, subject
to copyright.
"Right to copyright a book in which one has expended labor does
not depend on whether the materials which he has collected consist of
matters which are publici juris, or whether such materials show literary
skill or originality, either in thought or language, or anything more than
industrious collection." 64 Courts have said that all that was required
to be worthy of copyright was that the material have some value to
place it above mere worthlessness, and allowed a copyright on the plaintiff's topical song.65 In American Trotting Register Ass'n. v. Gocher,66
it was held that a mere compilation of facts may be protected as well
as original matter showing invention.
However, any insignificant change which does not even require ordinary skill is not sufficient to endow a work with copyright protection.
Thus in Snow v. Laird,67 the plaintiff changed the negative of a photograph by putting a cane in the left hand of a reclining pictured man.
The photograph had previously become public property and the question was whether this change was sufficient to make a new picture which
could be copyrighted. The court decided that to allow such protection
would be to encourage deceit and extortion. Such a small change would
not be enough. Also, a colorable change solely for the purpose of retrieving abandoned copyright is insufficient, nor is mere aggregating
of old material into a single publication sufficient amount of ordinary
skill to lend copyrightability. A few cases have held that to allow a
copyright there need not be ordinary skill, but only the expenditure of
labor; 6 8 and there have been those to the contrary that are much
stricter and require inventive merit.6 9 Thus in Motts Iron Works v.
Clow, 70 a priced catalogue illustrated with pictures of wares offered
for sale was not a proper subject of copyright where the letter press
63
64

65
66

67
68

69
70

281 F. 83 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1922).

Ibid.
Henderson v. Tompkins, 60 F. 758 (C. C. Mass., 1894).
10 F. 237 (1895).
98 F. 813 (C. C. A. 7th, 1900).
Grey v. Russell, I Story 11. See AmDUR, COPYRIGHT LAW
Bullinger-v. Mackay, F. Cas. 2127, 4 F. Cas. 649.
82 F. 316, 27 C. C. A. 250 (I1., 1897).
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NOTES
of the book was confined to a statement of the dimensions and prices,
and had no literary value, and illustrations had no artistic worth. And
in George Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,7 1 the court decided that chromolithographs for the advertising of Wallace's circus,
with pictures of men and women on bicycles was of sufficient merit for
copyright. However, there was a strong dissent by Justice Harlow,
"We are unable to discover anything useful or meritorious in the design copyrighted by the plaintiff in error other than advertisement of
acts to be done or exhibited in Wallace's show. No evidence aside from
deductions which are to be drawn from the prints themselves was offered to show that these designs had any original artistic qualities.
No value or merit existed outside of advertising a show." Cigar labels,
containing names and cuts of the faces of the dealers, together with
fancy scroll work, were not "writings" subject to copyright protection. 72 Despite these last few cases however, the general rule remains
the same, that courts will generally disregard the merit of the particular
work copyrighted or to be copyrighted, and require little special skill
to grant the statute's protection.
6. Illegal or Immoral Worhs
No copyright can be acquired in a -work which is inherently of an
indecent or immoral character, or deceptive as to authorship or contents, or which is otherwise illegal."3 This proposition seems to be
almost too obvious to deserve mention, but there are certain questions
as to what illegality or immorality would be required to vitiate chances
of copyright. In Richardson v. Miller,74 the fact that playing cards
may be used for gambling, thus violating the laws against such games
of chance, did not deprive them of the protection of copyright law.
"Copyright will not protect the authors of immoral works. But
where there is nothing immoral or improper in the prints themselves,
the fact that the playing cards may be used by persons violating the
laws agaihst gambling does not deprive them of protection of the law.
To do this it must appear either that there is something immoral, pernicious, or indecent in the things per se, or that they are incapable of
any use except in connection with some illegal or immoral act." Undoubtedly copyright could not be obtained on pornographic or seditious
literature or pictures. In Egbert v. Greenburg,75 a form chart was
copyrightable because it could be used by persons engaged in breeding, training, and racing horses, even though the chief use would be
an illegal one, betting. A musical composition of immoral character
of course could not be protected, but there is much matter for debate
71
72

188 U. S. 239, 47 L. Ed. 460 (1903).

M. B. Fahey Tobacco Co. v. Senior, 247 F. 809 (U. S. C. A. N. Y., 1922)
73 18 C. J. S. 170.
74 20 F. Cas. 11,791 (C. C. Mass., 1877).
75 100 F. 447 (C. C. Cal., 1900).
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as to just what is immoral. The word "hottest" as referring to a girl,
in a song, "Dora Dean," was held to be vulgar and subject to indelicate
meaning and therefore not copyrightable. 70 It is questionable whether
the same result would be reached by courts today. Deceptive advertising will not be protected: misrepresentation of facts in an advertisement of a piano company vitiated a copyright, 77 and the same happened as to misrepresentations on the label of a whiskey bottle. 78 You
cannot secure a copyright on material which has been pirated from
someone else's copyrighted work. Thus a directory containing matter
stolen from a prior directory is not copyrightable at least as to the
matter pirated and which had been substituted in the directory without any independent investigation. 79 The whole field on this matter
of illegal publications is largely factual, and the best general rule
would seem to be that copyright will not be granted on material essentially illegal or subject to no other use than an evil one.
Conclusion
Therefore, if a man writes a book and wishes to know just what in
his work can be protected by obtaining a copyright thereon, let him
not jump to the rash conclusion that he has secured h monopoly to
everything that he has written. He will gain no protection for his
theme, general idea, or source of information, or his title. And if the
work is one whose main purpose is use rather than explanation, he
will fail. The same applies if the subject is one taken from a government publication, or if much of the material is illegal or immoral. These
different rules greatly qualify the protection afforded by the copyright statute.
Leon L. Lancaster, Jr.

OIL AND GAS LAW -

THE VALIDITY OF OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION

years
after petroleum was first discovered in paying quantities in Pennsylvania very little was known of its nature and origin. This ignorance
of scientific facts about oil and gas resulted in the early Pennsylvania
courts laying down the "Rule of Capture." This rule was based on the
false assumption that petroleum was to be found in underground basins
or lakes and on the belief that oil flowed as freely as subterranean
waters. The rule was in reliance upon the inorganic theory that the
supply was constantly being replenished through chemical processes.
LAWS INCLUDING THE OKLAHOMA WELL-SPACING STATUTE.-For
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Broder et al. v. Zeno Mauvais Music Co., 88 F. 74 (C. C. Cal., 1898).
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Stone & McGarrick v. Dugan Piano Co., 210 F. 399 (C. C. A., 1914).

78 Krauss v. Peebles's Sons Co., 58 F. 585.
79 Chicago Dollar Directory Co. v. Chicago Directory Co., 14 C. C. A. 213,
24 U. S. App. 636, 66 F. 977 (1895).

NOTES
There is some dispute as to which case laid down the "Rule of
Capture," but the first case of importance was probably Westmoreland
& Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt,' in 1889.2 The court there
said: "Water and oil and still more strongly gas, may be classed by
themselves, if the analogy be not too fanciful, as minerals ferae naturae.
In common with animals, and unlike other minerals, they have the
power and the tendency to escape without the volition of the owner.
Their 'fugitive and wandering existence within the limits of a particular tract was uncertain' as said by Chief Justice Agnew in Brown v.
Vandergrift.3 They belong to the owner of the land and are part of it,
so long as they are on or in it, and are subject to his control; but
when they escape, and go into other land, or come under another's
control, the title of the former is gone. Possession of the land therefore, is not necessarily possession of the gas. If an adjoining, or even
a distant, owner, drills his own land, and taps your gas, so that it
comes into his well and under his control, it is no longer yours, but his."
But to-day with modem scientific information at hand, the "Rule
of Capture" is being rapidly discredited. The more modem and scientific rule 'of conservation is fast replacing the old rule by means of
statutory provisions. The Magna Carta of this statutory oil and gas
4
conservation is the Indiana case of Ohio Oil Co. v. State of Indiana.
This case in 1900 upheld an Indiana statute of 1893 giving the State
of Indiana the right to restrict the waste of oil and gas by making it
unlawful to permit oil or gas to escape into the open air, without being
confined within the well or proper pipes or other safe receptacles, for
more than two days after striking the oil or gas in a well. The United
States Supreme Court held that the state could regulate the production of oil and gas and prohibit its waste, practically without limit; and
in so doing the state was not restricted by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution or by the constitutional guaranties in favor
of private property contained in the fundamental laws of the states.
In 1931 the United States Supreme Court further held in Bandini
Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court 5 that the prohibition of waste was
not contra to the due process clause of the Constitution under the police
power of the state. The case upheld the principle of correlative rights
and duties existing between oil operators. The following year in
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma 6
Justice Butler recognized the principles of the Indiana statute case:
"Every person has the right to drill wells on his own land and take
1

130 Pa. 235, 18 Atl. 724 (1889).
The Statutory Spacing of Wells, an address by James A. Veasey, April 21,
1939, before the Louisiana Bar Association Annual Meeting, Alexandria, Louisiana,
privately published.
8 80 Pa. 142 (1875).
4 177 U. S. 190, 20 Sup. Ct. 576, 44 L. Ed. 729 Aff'g., 150 Ind. 698, 50 N. E.
1125 (1900).
5 284 U. S. 8, 52 Sup. Ct. 103, 76 L. Ed. 136, 78 A. L. R. 826 (1931).
6 286 U. S. 210, 52 Sup. Ct. 559, 76 L. Ed. 1062, 86 A. L. R. 403 (1932).
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from the pools below all the gas and oil that he may be able to reduce
to possession including that coming from land belonging to others, but
the right to take and thus acquire ownership is subject to the reasonable exertion of the power of the state to prevent unnecessary loss, destruction or waste. And that power extends to the taker's unreasonable
and wasteful use of natural gas pressure available for lifting oil to the
surface and the unreasonable depletion of a common supply of gas
and oil to the injury of others entitled to resort to and take from the
same pool."
Thus there can be seen a definite trend away from the "Rule of
Capture" in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. And
it must be remembered that these decisions are backed by modem
geology. When the early Pennsylvania cases were decided, geology was
little known. And even in 1900 when the Indiana statute was declared
valid, geology still hadn't come into its own, and that case was really
far in advance of its time. It was not until about 1915 that geology
really became generally accepted by the oil industry. In that year
Oklahoma was the first state to adopt a comprehensive conservation
and proration law. The Corporation Commission of Oklahoma was
given the right to prohibit "underground waste." In 1920 George Otis
Smith, Director of the Geological Survey said that implied covenants
were the opposite of conservation, for the doctrine of implied covenants
compels speedy drilling and full production by means of off-set wells
to keep the underground oil from flowing away into wells on neighboring property. 7 Geology and practical experience together have proven
that a prorated oil field will in the long run produce more oil from the
same source of supply than would the same field if the "Rule of
Capture" were to prevail and everyone tried to capture all of the oil
as soon as possible.8 Gas pressure has much to do with this fact, for
it is important in the recovery of oil. If the gas-oil ratio is kept at a
set figure (to be determined by experts) the recovery will be ultimately
greater. But if the ratio is not observed and the gas pressure is wasted
in the recovery of the oil, the ultimate result will be a loss in the recovery of the oil. Therefore, it can be seen that geology and conservation go hand in hand.
One of the fundamental practices of true conservation is scientific
well-spacing. The 1935 Oklahoma well-spacing statute is a typical one:
"In the event a producing well, or wells, is completed upon a unit where
there are two or more separately owned tracts, any royalty owner or
group of royalty owners, holding the royalty interest under a separately owned tract, shall share in one-eighth of all of the production from
the well or wells drilled within the unit in the proration that the acreage
of their separately owned tract bears to the acreage of the unit." 9
7

15 NoTRE DAmE LAWY. 229 (1940).

8 Op. cit. supra note 2.
9 Ch. 59, Article 1, Okla. Session Laws, 1935, 52 OKLA. ST. ANN. §§ 85-87,
136-138.
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The validity of this statute was affirmed in Patterson v. Stanolind
Oil and Gas Co.1o Here the plaintiff's claim to the division of the
profits of a ten-acre tract of oil land was based on the terms of his
mineral deed, while the defendant oil company based its claim on the
well-spacing statute and the Corporation Commission's ruling thereunder. The Commission's ruling was a typical one: "That the said
well as above described is located in the approximate center of a tenacre tract of land, and taking into consideration the depth of the well
now producing in said common source, the nature and character of the
reservoir energy, the formations encountered in the drilling of the
well, and the history and productive characteristics of wells in other
common sources of supply which have similar formations, and from
other geological and scientific information and data as shown by the
records, the Commission finds that a well-spacing and drilling unit
of ten-acres and of uniform size should be established in the said North
Wellston pool; that the same would tend to effect and would result
in uniform withdrawal and in the greatest ultimate recovery of oil, and
would best conserve reservoir energy, and would protect the relative
rights of the leaseholders and royalty owners in said common source
of supply." The plaintiff claimed under the "Rule of Capture" that it is
fundamental oil and gas law that the owner is entitled to all such
minerals that he is able to reduce to possession. But the defendant contended that the plaintiff's theory is not applicable to oil and gas derived from a source of supply common to.adjoining tracts of land and
that the production of the well in question was derived from such a
common source of supply. The Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld both
*the statute and the Commission's ruling thereunder, thus agreeing with
the defendant's contention. In so holding the court said: "The police
power of the state extends to protecting the correlative rights of owners
in a common source of oil and gas supply and this power may be lawfully exercised by regulating the drilling of wells into said common
source of supply and distributing the production thereof among the
owners of mineral rights in land overlying said common source of supply." The court also said that the plaintiff's property had not been
confiscated, but its use had merely been restricted and qualified, which,
of course, does not violate the due process clause of the Federal or
Oklahoma State Constitution. So the plaintiff must submit to the
police power of the state. The court reasoned that since the police
power of the state may be exercised by the regulation of production,"
why not regulate production by the regulation of the drilling of wells
by means of well-spacing acts. It would be far better to restrict the
drilling of wells than to restrict their production after they are drilled.
It is known that too many wells will tap too quickly the common reser10 305 U. S. 376, 59 Sup. Ct. 259, 83 L. Ed. 231 Aff'g., 182 Okla. 155, 77 Pac.

2d 83 (1938).
11 Op. cit. supra note 5.
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voir and thus will waste the gas energy needed for the natural flow of
the oil. The less the reservoir is punctured, the less the supply of reservoir energy is likely to be depleted. This "back-pressure" should not
be wasted.
Thus the court got to the root of the problem, the number of wells
themselves. By cutting down on the number of wells, each well that
is drilled will be permitted to pump more oil than if there were a
greater number of wells. Thus by limiting the wells, the same amount
of oil can be produced while better preserving the gas pressure and
while saving the cost of drilling additional unnecessary wells. The
result is two-fold: the industry itself is served by lower-cost production, and the public is benefited by more reasonable prices for petroleum
products.
The conservation theory is gaining so rapidly over the "Rule of
Capture" that it is safe to say that it will soon replace it entirely. Today all but two of the larger oil producing states have united in an
inter-state pact for the conservation of oil and gas. The only large oil
producing states that have not as yet joined the pact are California
and Illinois. But these two states are the second and third largest oil
producing states, in the Union respectively, Illinois having just recently surpassed Oklahoma as the third ranking oil producing state.
In August, 1939, when the states in the pact agreed to shut down production entirely in an effort to raise crude oil prices, California and
Illinois refused to cooperate and continued to flood the market. It is
such lack of cooperation as this that may eventually bring federal control of the industry. The "Cole Bill" 13 calling for such federal control
by means of an Office of Petroleum Conservation was defeated recently,
but it may be just a preliminary attempt to put the industry under
federal control.
It is to be hoped that such states as California and Illinois will soon
join the interstate pact, and will thus complete the triumph of the
conservation theory over the "Rule of Capture" without the evils of
federal control being included. Illinois in particular should beware, for
the Illinois wells are noted for slipping rapidly in production. Unless
another large field is discovered in the state, Oklahoma with its steady
prorated production will soon take over its former place as the third
largest oil producing state. But whether the triumph of the conservation theory comes by means of federal control or by fear of it, with
the states taking the initiative, it is certainly coming soon.
lames H. Graham, Jr.
12 Op. cit. supra note 2.
13

H. R. 7372, The Petroleum Conservation Act of 1939, a bill to promote

the conservation of petroleum.
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TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF.-As the
statutes of most states require a testator to be of sound mind at the

time he executes his will, it becomes important to discover just what
constitutes "soundness of mind" as pertaining to the execution of a

will. The courts are almost unanimous in holding that perfect sanity
is not required. "To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not
necessary that the mind should be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, and
unshattered by disease or otherwise, or that the testator be in possession of all his reasoning facilities...." 1 In an early case, the Indiana
Supreme Court held, under a statute providing that no one of unsound
mind could make a will, that absolute, perfeet sanity was needed."
Later this ruling was expressly overruled in the case of Burkhart v.
Gladish;3 the court holding that "soundness of mind" as used in the
statute had a relative meaning connoting sanity sufficient to execute a
will. The Supreme Court of Maine in carrying out this idea stated: "In
law, every mind is sound that can reason and will intelligently, in the
particular transaction being considered; and every mind is unsound or

insane who cannot so reason. The law investigates no further." 4
The mental capacity to execute a will has been compared to the
mental capacity to execute other acts. In an early case, 5 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overruled a case on the instruction given to the
jury that "A degree of incapacity less than enough to acquit a man for
a criminal charge would invalidate a will." The difficulty with this test
is at once apparent. Criminal capacity involves primarily the ability to
distinguish between right and wrong, while testamentary capacity involves the ability to understand the estate to be disposed of, the proper
objects of the testator's bounty and the nature of the testamentary act. 6
Michigan has held that the incapacity to manage property is not
proof of incapacity to make a will, but the power to make a contract
8
7
is equivalent to the power to make a will. Maryland adheres to the

view that if the individual was not of sound and disposing mind and
capable of making a valid deed or contract, he was not in possession
of that degree of mental competency required by law for the execution
of a will. Illinois has held that a greater degree of mental capacity is
required for the execution of contracts and the transaction of ordinary
business. Mental strength to compete with antagonists and understanding to protect his own interests are essentials in the transaction of ordinary business, while it is sufficient for the making of a will that the
1

Campbell v. Campbell, 130 111.466, 22 N. E. 620, 622, 6 L. R. A. 167 (1889).

2 Noble v. Enos, 19 Ind. 167 (1859).
3 Burkhart v. Gladish, 123 Ind.'337, 24 N. E. 118 (1887).
4 Johnson v. Maine & N. B. Ins. Co., 83 Me. 182, 22 Atl. 107, 108 (1891).
McTaggert v. Thompson, 14 Pa. 149, 154 (1850).
8 PAG ON WNILs, § 138.
7 Rice v. Rice, 50 Mich. 448, 15 N. W. 545 (1883).
8 Lyons v. Townsend, 124 Md. 163, 91 AtI. 704 (1914).
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testator understand the business in which he is engaged, his property,
the natural objects of his bounty, and the disposition he desires to
make. 9 Other jurisdictions have laid down rules of similar effect: "In
order to possess the mental capacity to make a will the law, based upon
experience of mankind, does not require the testator to be able to carry
on a complicated business." 10
In the case of Murphy v. Nelt," the Montana Supreme Court criticized the jurisdiction holding that mental capacity to carry on a business or to make contracts is equivalent to the mental capacity required
to execute a valid will. The question therewas whether a requested instruction to the effect that less degree of mind was required to execute
a will than a contract was properly refused. The court stated, "With
all due respect to these learned decisions, we think that in such matters
comparisons are odious, and, for purposes of instructing the jury, wholly
unnecessary. To make a will, or a contract implies more than merely
signing it, and it contravenes human experience to say that the conception, ordering and comprehension of a will dispensing, with care and
precision, extensive property, involving, it may be, charities and trusts
of various kinds, requires less capacity than the purchase of a bar of
soap; or that the same intellectual capacity is required for simple
holographic, 'I leave all my property to my wife' and for the elaboration of a complex trade agreement designed to accomplish far reaching
results. The conclusion of common sense is that it takes more mind to
make some wills than to make some contracts, and vice versa and there
is excellent authority for the rule, while contractual capacity implies
prima facie the capacity to make a will, yet neither is a test for the
other, and the presence or absence of one does not conclusively establish the presence or absence of the other." The general rule as laid down
by Rollison, in his work on wills

12

is that in the absence of delusions,

one who has capacity to contract or transact ordinary business has the
capacity to make a will.
In formulating a test as to just what constitutes adequate mental
capacity to execute a will, the following quotation from Drum v.
Capps 13 must be kept in mind, "Clearly by reason of authority, therefore, each case must be largely judged in connection with its own special facts, circumstances and surroundings." Another admonishment is
found in, In re Vaughn's Estate,14 "Any definition of testamentary
capacity is more or less arbitrary and subject to revision or modification
as new combinations arise." In a majority of the jurisdictions 15 the
0 Coleman v. Marshall, 263 Ill. 330, 104 N. E. 1042 (1912).

10 Burnhill v. Miller, 114 Kan. 773, 217 Pac. 274, 275 (1923).
11 Murphy v. Nelt, 47 Mont. 38, 130 Pac. 451, 455 (1913).
12 ROLLISON ON WILLs, § 53.
13 Drum v. Capps, 240 Ill. 524, 88 N. E. 1020, 1025 (1909).
14 In re Vaughn's Estate, 137 Wash. 512, 242 Pac. 1094, 1095 (1926).
15 ROLLISON ON WILLS, § 52. Also see, In re Di Labeaga's Estate, 165 Cal.
607, 133 Pac. 307 (1913) ; Hart v. Hart, 290 Ill. 476, 125 N. E. 366 (1923) ; Rede-
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general rule is that the testator at the time of making his will must
have had ability to understand: (a) the nature of the business in which
he was engaged; (b) the property to be disposed; (c) his relation to
the natural objects of his bounty; (d) the manner in which he wishes
to dispose of his property.
There are several views as to whom has the burden of proof and as.
to the presumptions as to the testator's sanity in actions to probate
and contest the probate of wills. "Burden of proof" as used by the
courts is a vague term. It is used in three different senses; first, to indicate that one party must maintain the affirmative of the issue by a
preponderance of evidence, secondly as indicating that one party has
the duty of making out a- prima facie case, third that at any stage in
the introduction of evidence one party has supported the issue by so
much evidence that he will win unless the adverse party furnishes
evidence. 1 For the purposes here, "burden of proof" will be used as
defined in the first and second definitions above.
The weight of authority places the burden of showing the statutory
execution of the will and the mental capacity of the testator on the
proponent. 17 Various reasons are given for this rule. "Whoever asserts
a right dependent for its existence upon a negative must establish the
truth of the negative by a preponderance of evidence. This must be
the rule, or it must follow that rights of which a negative forms an
essential element, may be enforced without proof." Is The English
Courts reason that the heirs at law rest securely on the statutes of
descent and distribution until some legal act has been done by which
their rights under the statute have been lost. For a will to be valid
and derogate the statutes of descent and distribution the testator must
have been mentally competent as required by the Statute of Wills. 19
man v. Ruff, 196 Ky. 471, 244 S. W. 910 (1924); Murphy v. Nelt, supra, note 11;

27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1 n.; L. R. A. 1915A, 443 n.
16

PAGE ON WIMLS, § 685.

17 In re Gillman's Appeal, 115 Conn. 724, 161 At. 845 (1932); Cooper v.
Shannon, 165 Ga. 451, 141 S. E. 306 (1928); Millage v. Noble, 334 Ii. 315, 166
N. E. 50 (1929); Breadheft v. Cleveland, 184 Ind. 130, 108 N. E. 5, aff'd., 110

N. E. 662 (1915); Holden v. Bennett, 243 Ky. 667, 49 S. W. 2d 568 (1932); Appeal of Martin, 133 Me. 422, 179 Atl. 655 (1935); In re Brulum's Estate, 240

Mich. 393, 215 N. W. 299 (1927); Guttings v. Howard, 122 Miss. 355, 84 So. 240
(1920); Soureal v. Wisner, 321 Mo. 920, 13 S. W. 2d 548 (1929); In re Boyer's

Estate, 119 Neb. 191, 227 N. W. 928 (1928); In re Strang's Will, 109, N. J. Eq.
523, 158 Atl. 489 (1932); In re McClear's Will, 214 App. Div. 683, 213 N. Y.

Supp. 66, aff'd., 247 N. Y. 544, 161 N. E. 175 (1926); Peace v. Peace, 149 Okla.
123, 299 Pac. 451 (1931); In re Rigg's Estate, 120 Ore. 38, 250 Pac. 753 (1926);

In re Llewellyn's Estate, 296 Pa. 74, 145 Atl. 810, 66 A. L. R. 222 (1929) ; Hollingworth v. Kresge, 48 R. I. 341, 137 Atl. 908 (1927); Sutton v. Sadlier, 3 C. B.
(N. S.) 87, 140 Eng. Rep. 671 (1857).
18 Steinkuehler v. Wemper, 169 Ind. 154, 160, 81 N. E. 482, 484, 15 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 673 (1907).
19 Sutton v. Sadlier, supra, note 17.
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The right to make a will is neither a constitutional nor a common law
right but one conferred by statute. Therefore one relying on a will must
prove it conforms to the statute which gave the power under which
20
it was made.
The jurisdictions holding according to the above ruling are in conflict as to just how this. "burden of proof" must be met or satisfied.
Many courts have ruled that it is not necessary to prove the mental
competency of the testator by affirmative evidence; that after proving
the formal execution of the will the common law presumption that all
men are sane comes into effect and a prima facie case is established in
favor of the proponent.' 1 The presumption that all men are sane is a
very deep rooted principle of law. "Sanity, for example, being the
normal condition of man, the courts will presume every man to be sane
until the contrary is proved." *'"The general presumption of sanity applies to criminal acts, every one presumed to be sane and criminally responsible for his acts. " 3 The law of contracts and conveyances also recognizes this presumption. 2 4 This presumption is not conclusive and
may be overcome by competent evidence. "The presumption of sanity,
cannot, we think be treated as merely artificial or legal presumption, but
at the utmost, as a presumption of law and fact that is an inference
to be made by the jury from the absence of evidence to show that a
party does not enjoy that soundness which experience proves to be a
general condition of the human mind." 2-, Kentucky holds that the
proponents must show more than the statutory formal execution of the
will before the presumption tomes into effect in the following: "The
rule is if the, will is rational and consistent on its face in its structure
and language, the contestees [proponents] have shown statutory execution, the burden shifts to the contestants to establish the unsoundness
of mind of the testator, but, if the will is so irrational or inconsistent
as to be incompatible with the soundness of mind, then the introduction
of evidence of mental soundness is necessary in the preliminary proof
for the propounders." 26 So it is that the instrument is often the best
2
evidence against itself.

7

In Michigan, the rule that the proponent has the burden of proving
testamentary capacity by affirmative evidence 28 was changed by stat20
21

Appeal of Martin, supra, note 17.
Cooper v. Shannon, Millage v. Noble, Breadheft v. Cleveland, Holden v.

Bennett, In re Boyer's Estate, In re Strang's Will,. In re Rigg's Estate, In re

Llewellyn's Estate, Hollingworth v. Kresge, Sutton v. Sadlier, supra, note 17.
22 10 R. C. L. (1929) § 25, 14 R. C. L. (1929) § 74.
23 Sanders v. The State, 94 Ind. 147 (1884).
282 (1882).
24 Menkins v. Lightner, 18 Ill.
25 Sutton v. Sadlier, 3 C. B. (N. S.) 87, 140 Eng. Rep. 671, 675 (1857).
26 Holden v. Bennett, supra, note 17.
Jackson Excr's. v. Semmes, 266 Ky. 352, 99 S.W. 2d 505 (1937).
27
28
Preveles v. Bates, 93 Mich. 234, 53 N. W. 153 (1892).

NOTES
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In a holding subsequent to the taking effect of this statute, it

was ruled that the common law presumption of sanity shall prevail in
favor of the proponent. 29
A few jurisdictions while placing the burden of proof of the mental
capacity of the testator on the proponent hold that the mental capacity
must be proved by affirmative evidence.30 Some of these courts have
held that the statutes that give the power to dispose of property by will
are in derogation of the common law and therefore should be interpreted
literally; that the provision in these statutes requiring the testator to
be of sound mind at the time he executes the will repealed the common
law presumption of sanity in such cases. 31 Connecticut courts 32 have
reasoned that since the law requires witnesses to be present at the
time of the execution of the will, it is necessary to have them testify
as to the mental capacity at the time, and not only the formal execution of the will. These courts believe it is logical to place more faith
in the observations of the witnesses than in the presumption of sanity.
Under a statute providing "the contestant is the plaintiff, and the
petitioner is the defendant," 33 in actions to probate wills, the Supreme
Court of California has placed the burden of proof of testamentary
capacity on the contestant.34 The court stated that it was unable to
see any good reason for the somewhat peculiar statutory provision
as far as contest before probate is concerned but that it must take the
law as it finds it.
Although Colorado,35 Indiana,3 6 and Washington 37 place the burden of proof on the proponent before probate, they shift the burden
to the contestant after probate.3 8 "The admission of a will to probate
by a court having jurisdiction is a judicial act and like other valid
judgments cannot be collaterally impeached for error or irregularity,
but is binding until reversed or set aside according to law, and for tlat
28a ComP. LAws, MIcH. (1929) § 14212. "In proceedings for the probate of
wills it shall not be necessary for the proponent in the first instance to introduce
any proof to show the competency of the decedent to make a will but like presumption of mental capacity shall obtain as in other cases."
29 Bereton v. Glazeby's Estate, 250 Mich. 234, 231 N. W. 566 (1930).
30 In re Barber's Appeal, 115 Conn. 724, 161 Atl. 845 (1935); Fields v. Luch,
335 Mo. 765, 74 S. W. 2d 35 (1934); Mechen v. Mechen, 17 W. Va. 683, 41 Am.
Rep. 682 (1881).
31 Fields v. Luch, supra, note 30.
32 In re Barber's Appeal, supra, note 30.
33 CAL. CoDE, Civ. PRoC., § 1312 (1937).
34 In re Latour's Estate, 140 Cal. 414, 40 Pac. 1070 (1903).
35 Nelson v. Phillips, 70 Colo. 196, 199 Pac. 481 (1921).
30 Breadheft v. Cleveland, 184 Ind. 130, 108 N. E. 5; aff'd., 110 N. E. 662
(1915).
37 In re Baldwin's Estate, 13 Wash. 666, 43 Pac. 934 (1896).
38 In re Hayes' Estates, 55 Colo. 340, 135 Pac. 449, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 531
(1913); Steinkuhler v. Wemper, 169 Ind. 154, 81 N. E. 482, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.)
673 (1907) ; In re Adam's Estate, 112 Wash. 379, 192 P. 887 (1920).

